![]() In dialetheism, as well as in Hegel’s philosophy, the challenge of thinking the truth of contradiction is accepted. If we want to endorse an actualizing approach with respect to Hegel’s philosophy, the research on paraconsistent logical systems and especially on dialetheism represents a more promising choice. Brandom’s effort to actualize Hegel’s thought fails, insofar as his account does not involve the essential core of this thought. ![]() This very removal of the thesis of the truth of contradiction entails Brandom’s subscription to a project that is wholly different from Hegel’s one. In order to do that, I will try to explain how Brandom misses the self-reflective character of Hegel’s notion of determinate negation, and how this gap prevents him to understand the truth contradictory nature of logical determinations in Hegel’s system. The aim of my paper is to show how Brandom’s reading fails to grasp the true nature of contradiction in Hegel’s thought. In Brandom’s view, Hegelian dialectic is perfectly consistent: contradiction is nothing other than the relation of modally robust exclusion through which a conceptual meaning determines itself as the determinate negation of other incompatible conceptual meanings. Robert Brandom, in Tales of the Mighty Dead, claims that far from rejecting the law of noncontradiction Hegel radicalizes it, and places it at the very center of his thought. Nevertheless, this is not the only way to look at Hegel’s philosophical picture. If so, his logic is inconsistent and it seems to be condemned to absurdity. Hegel seems to claim that contradictions are true. The strongest expression of this new conception of logic is the first thesis of the work Hegel discussed in 1801 in order to get his teaching habilitation: contradictio est regula veri, non contradiction falsi. ![]() Authors, editors and contributors Paul Ashton NMIT and LaTrobe University Toula Nicolacopoulos LaTrobe University George Vassilacopoulos LaTrobe UniversityĬontradiction or not-contradiction? Brandom’s Interpretation of Hegelian Dialectic According to Horstmann, Hegel thinks of his new logic as being in part incompatible with traditional logic. Binetti, Wendell Kisner, Paul Ashton and Robert Sinnerbrink. Burbidge, Paul Redding, Angelica Nuzzo, David Gray Carlson, Simon Lumsden, Karin de Boer, David Rose, Andrew Haas, Toula Nicolacopoulos, George Vassilacopoulos, Jorge Armando Reyes Escobar, Maria J. ![]() This book includes contributions from: H. 10) Is it becoming more obvious today that the thinkers of the post-Hegelian era were/are not ‘able to bear the greatness, the immensity of the claims made by the human spirit’? Is our era the era of the ‘faint-hearted’ philosophy? Celebrating 200 years since the publication of The Phenomenology of Spirit this volume addresses these questions through a renewed encounter with Hegel’s thought. Description ‘It belongs to the weakness of our time not to be able to bear the greatness, the immensity of the claims made by the human spirit, to feel crushed before them, and to flee from them faint-hearted.’ (Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, v2, p. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |